The very first line of Keegan's main text tells us that "War is not the continuation of policy by other means. Would Prussia in have dared to invade France with 70, men if she had had an inkling that the repercussions in case of failure would be strong enough to overthrow the old European balance of power.
The importance—and challenge—of the academic study of war is to elevate that popular enthusiasm into a more capacious and serious understanding, one that seeks answers to such questions as: Supporters may evoke the sliding scale that Michael Walzer describes in Just and Unjust Wars, in which graver threats to the body politic may permit the gradual weakening of moral constraints.
This state of affairs is profoundly troubling, for democratic citizenship requires knowledge of war—and now, in the age of weapons of mass annihilation, more than ever. No pacifist, Keegan argues that the contemporary armies of the developed world have a continuing mission to bring peace and order to the world.
Many of his observations are in fact reinforced by the message of On War, if only because both are based on the same empirical experience of war.
In other words, human biology can affect thinking what is thought, how, for what duration and intensityand can accordingly affect cultural developments, and in turn cultural institutions can affect biological and rational developments e.
The reforms of Prussia's army and society initiated by Clausewitz's mentor Scharnhorst, for example, ran utterly contrary to Prussia's military and political culture. Conformity and coercion smothered our innately pacifist selves. He should also be aware, however, of the sharp limits on the role of rational calculation in a phenomenon equally dominated by chance and blind emotion.
The individual historian or theorist therefore gains little by a wholesale rejection of Clausewitz, and the community of thinkers and scholars benefits not at all from the systematic misrepresentation of his historical role or of his ideas.
In any case, that is the approach of modern Clausewitzians, and it is necessary to distinguish—as critics like Liddell Hart and Keegan generally have failed to do—between the ideas of the philosopher himself and those of his proponents in any given era.
They saw an opportunity to rid the Middle East of a dangerous dictator and create a new democratic model for the region. His wife and their four children survive him. Concerning the narrower topic of Clausewitz, much of Keegan's deviltry is in the details, but this article shall seek out the most fundamental errors.
He evoked the sights, sounds and smells of war, vividly bringing home the experience for both veterans and civilian readers. Such efforts are essentially ahistorical.
Some seek more complicated versions of the astrological vision of the medieval mind e. Most readers and that includes, unfortunately, many professional writers on military affairs and military history take their understanding of Clausewitz from secondary and tertiary works like Keegan's.
Iraq is a Shia-dominated state with an alienated Sunni minority, rampant violence and virtually no control over the Kurdish north. However, etymologically war's definition does refer to conceptions of war that have either been discarded or been imputed to the present definition, and a cursory review of the roots of the word war provides the philosopher with a glimpse into its conceptual status within communities and over time.
He also brought his unrivalled grasp of the reality of military engagements to the frequent flare-ups which succeeded the fall of communism. Interview, Quantico, VA, 9 September I recently tried to suggest to Keegan, not only that he was using the word "Clausewitzian" to refer to ideas which did not originate with Clausewitz and were, in many cases, flatly contradictory to the theories of On War, but that a great many of his own ideas were in no way inimical to those theories.
Six Democrats who ultimately ran for President in and voted for the resolution. Iraq was on the top of that list. John Keegan, né le 15 mai à Clapham et mort le 2 août dans l'East Devon, est un historien militaire et journaliste britannique.
Il a publié de très nombreux ouvrages sur les conflits militaires du XIV e au XXI e siècle dans les domaines aussi variés que la guerre terrestre, maritime, aérienne ou du renseignement mais aussi sur la.
from the magazine Why Study War? Military history teaches us about honor, sacrifice, and the inevitability of conflict. John Desmond Patrick Keegan was born on May 15and after the declaration of war was taken to the depths of rural England where his Irish father, a south London schools inspector who had been.
John Keegan, widely considered the greatest military historian of our time and the author of acclaimed volumes on ancient and modern warfare--including, most recently, The First World War, a national bestseller--distills what he knows about the why’s and how’s of armed conflict into a series of brilliantly concise essays.
Is war a natural condition of. John Keegan's books include The Iraq War, Intelligence in War, The First World War, The Battle for History, The Face of Battle, War and Our World, The Masks of Command, Fields of Battle, and A. Keegan's A History of Warfare argues, in essence, that war is a cultural rather than a political activity.
Warfare clearly is not a rational pursuit, since it does so much more harm than good even to the victors; it "is wholly unlike politics because it must be fought by men whose values and skills are not those of politicians and diplomats.".The iraq war john keegan